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Mistrust can cause Sub-optimal 
Outcomes
? The Security Dilemma
? Mistrust leads to conflict (Hobbes)
Problem of Exchange
? Mistrust can lead to 
market failure
? Milgrom, North and 
Weingast (1990) on the 
medieval revival of trade 
and Lex Mercatoria
Mediation is supposed to 
facilitate cooperation
? Can mediators promote trust?
? Under what conditions?
? Should they be biased or unbiased?
Standard model of these issues 
is the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Player 1
Cooperate Defect
Player 2 Cooperate 3, 3 1, 4
Defect 4, 1 2, 2
But PD is not appropriate
? Trust is a belief that the other side is likely to 
prefer cooperation to exploitation
? Presupposes uncertainty on this score
? In one shot PD, neither side does
? In repeated PD, they either do or do not, 
depending on the discount factor, δ
? Either way, there’s no uncertainty
Mediation and Bias
? Theory of how mediation works is 
underdeveloped
? So not clear when mediation can promote trust
? One question concerns mediator bias
? Is bias a good thing (Touval) or a bad thing (Young)?
Which Side Are You On?
? In my previous work I argued bias was essential 
(Kydd 2003)
? If the mediator tries to persuade one side to make 
a concession because the other side will fight, the 
mediator needs to be biased towards the side it is 
speaking to
However . . .
? Things may be different for different tasks that 
the mediator is trying to perform
? Perhaps for the trustbuilding role, being unbiased 
is better
A Model of Mediation and 
Mistrust
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1 Cooperate 1, 1, ρ -a1, b2, -β
Defect b1, -a2, β 0, 0, 0
The Players’ Types
? Each player may be trustworthy
bi < 1, (Assurance preferences) 
likelihood ti
? Or untrustworthy
bi > 1, (Prisoner’s Dilemma preferences) 
likelihood 1-ti
In equilibrium:
? Untrustworthy types have a dominant strategy to 
defect
? Trustworthy types can cooperate if they think the 
other side is likely enough to be trustworthy
The Mediator’s Payoffs
? Reward ρ for successful cooperation
? Payoff β in case player 1 exploits player 2
? Payoff -β in case player 2 exploits player 1
? So β is a measure of how biased the mediator is 
towards player 1
? If β = 0, the mediator is unbiased
? If β > 0 the mediator favors player 1
? If β < 0 the mediator favors player 2
The Mediator’s Beliefs
? Mediator gets signals from Nature about the 
players’ types
? likelihood of error is ε where ε < 0.5
? If the mediator gets the T signal, belief is
? P(iT|T) = ti(1-ε)/[ti(1-ε) + (1-ti)ε]
? If the mediator gets the U signal, belief is
? P(iT|U) = ti ε/[ti ε + (1-ti)(1-ε)]
? Note P(iT|T) > ti > P(it|U)
Order of Play
? Nature chooses each player’s type, signals 
mediator
? Mediator makes announcement about each 
player’s type, T or U
? Players play game (simultaneous choice)
When Mediation can Help
Mediation is only useful for middling levels of uncertainty
0 1m _m
Players too 
pessimistic
Players too 
optimistic
Appropriate 
range
ti
Truthtelling equilibria
? We are interested in truthtelling equilibria
? Where the mediator faithfully communicates to the 
players what it has learned from Nature
? If the players are trustworthy, the mediator says 
so, encouraging cooperation
? If the players are untrustworthy, the mediator say 
so, preventing cooperation
One Round Game
? In the one round game, there is no truthtelling 
equilibrium
? The mediator will not tell the truth about the 
players’ types
? Regardless of how biased or unbiased the mediator 
is
? Hence mediator is incapable of building trust
Why no truthtelling equilibrium?
? The mediator gets a positive payoff, ρ, if the 
players cooperate
? But gets zero if they both defect
? Hence the mediator has an incentive to encourage 
cooperation
Incentives for dishonesty
? If the mediator thinks the parties are likely to be 
trustworthy, the mediator will wish to say they are 
trustworthy, to encourage cooperation
? If the mediator thinks the parties are likely to be 
untrustworthy, the mediator still wants to vouch 
for them, to encourage cooperation
? Hence the mediator has an incentive to lie
The Repeated Game
? Consider a repeated version of the game
? Same mediator, new players each round
? Same information structure
? Mediator is “fired” if ever caught in a lie
? That is, if she vouches for a player who 
subsequently defects 
? Otherwise, mediator passes on to the next round
Repeated Game Payoffs
? Fee φ for mediating in each round
? Unconditional on the outcome
? Discount factor δ
? Likelihood of getting to the next round γ
? Stage game payoff π
Equilibria in Repeated Game
? Here there are truthtelling equilibria
? If the level of bias β is not too great
? And the reward ρ is not too great 
? And the fee φ and discount rate δ are not too small
What’s the incentive for 
honesty?
? If the mediator gets good news about the players, 
passing it on maximizes likelihood of reward, ρ,
just as in one shot game
? If the mediator gets bad news about the players, 
passing it on maximizes the likelihood of getting 
to the next round, and earning the fee, φ
? Can’t be caught in a lie if you don’t vouch for the 
parties
When is there a truthtelling
equilibrium?  
? Reward ρ cannot be too great
? Otherwise it becomes similar to the one shot game
? Mediator has incentive to encourage cooperation 
even if she has bad information about the parties
And . . .
? The fee φ and discount rate δ cannot be too small
? Or again it will be like the one shot game in which 
there is little incentive to try to get to the next 
round
And . . . 
? The mediator cannot be too biased (holding the 
other payoffs fixed), β cannot be too large or too 
small
? Or the mediator will have an incentive to vouch for 
the party towards whom they are biased
For instance
? if β is big, the mediator will be happy when 
player 1 exploits player 2, and will have an 
incentive to encourage this outcome by vouching 
for player 1 after getting bad information about 
her
Conclusion
? Mediators can build trust provided that
? They have a reputational incentive for honesty
? They are not excessively biased towards one side 
or the other
? So in the trustbuilding context, unbiased 
mediators are best, unlike in the bargaining 
context
